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ABSTRACT
This paper examines the impact of information supply and distribution on managerial information
processing using a model derived from the organizational information processing (OIP) framework
developed by Daft and Weick (1984). The model suggests that more supply and distribution of information wiltlead to greater information use and the acquisition of more knowledge, given the organization's information processing capabilities match its requirements. The model was extended to include
the influence of social factors (i. e., culture and power) and the level of knowledge in the organization.

Product managers in two consumer goods organizations providing different levels of information
technology support were studied to compare the effect of different approaches to supplying and distributing information. The focused comparison case research method (George and McKeown 1985)
was used, in which sites are selected differing only on the dimensions of interest, namely information
supply and distribution.
The cases provided evidence to support the model. The company which had more data and analytic
tools available for its product managers used more information and knew more about the factors that
influenced the marketing of its products. In addition, organizational culture and the level of knowledge
at the companies affected their approach to information supply, information use, and knowledge
acquisition. The results suggest that the effective use of information technology requires a combination of managing the organization culture and fitting the characteristics of information supply and
distribution mechanisms to information requirements.

1.

INTRODUCTION

the factors influencing this balance are complex, and
merely supplying the required information docs not necessarily insure its use (Feldman and March 1981, Kiesler
and Sproull 1982).

One of the major challenges facing the post-industrial
organization is the effective acquisition and distribution of

information in support of managerial decision making
(Huber 1984). Little research, however, has empirically
examined how managers use information in their work.
The organizational information processing (OIP) paradigm provides a framework for such research by prescribing that information processing (I/P) capabilities
match requirements (Galbraith 1973, Tushman and Nadler 1978) in an effective organization. Capabilities include the supply of available information and the mechanisms for its distribution. Information can come from
both internal sources (e.g., transaction processing sys-

The antecedents of information requirements have been

described in Goldstein (1988).

This paper empirically

examines information capabilities, focusing on the effect
of information supply and distribution on OIP. The re-

search is based on a model of I/P proposed by Daft and
Weick (1984), in which information supply is hypothesized
to affect information use, which in turn affects knowledge
acquisition. Information supply and distribution includes
the amount and type of data and analytic tools available
to managers. Information use is defined as the interpretation and analysis of information. Analysis can be done
by hand or by using analytical support tools such as cal-

tems) or external sources (e.g., third party data vendors).
Requirements include not only the amount of information

needed by managers, but its structure, format, level of

culators or computer-based decision support systems.

detail, reliability, and timeliness (Zmud 1978). The OIP
framework suggests that capabilities and requirements for
information should somehow be in balance. However,

Knowledge acquisition is the process of developing insights into the relationship between the organization and
its environment.
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mation (Weick 1979), and requires enacting or imposing
meaning (Weick 1979) or interpretation (Daft and Weick
1984) by communication using rich media (e.g., face-toface rather than written communication) (Daft, Lengel,
and Trevino 1987).

To examine I/P capabilities in a real-world setting, one
type of manager, product managers (PMs) at consumer
packaged goods companies, was studied in two organiza-

tions, each with a different level of information supply.
An in-depth study of similar functions in different settings
allowed us to isolate and compare the impact of different

approaches to information supply on managerial 1/P,
while holding other factors relatively constant.

Based on the levels of these variables, an I/P requirement is generated. The organization, in turn, provides an
I/P capability to meet this requirement. I/P capability is
provided by three primary mechanisms: structure, communication, and information technology (Galbraith 1973).
Information technology can be useful when high levels of
complexity, uncertainty, load, or equivocality exist. For
example, complexity can be managed by using decision
support systems which allow more variables (e.g., products, markets) to be analyzed and related. Uncertainty
can be reduced by more effectively and quickly delivering
the appropriate information where it is needed. Load can
be managed by using information technology to filter,
sort, route, or otherwise organize information for easier
use and increased throughput (Hiltz and Turoff 1985).

Product managers were chosen because their work is information-intensive (McCann 1986), they perform highly
similar functions in different companies (Quelch, Farris,

and Olver 1987) and different approaches to providing
information supply can be found at these companies (Mc-

Cann 1986). Providing information support for product
management is an important issue for MIS managers because of the complexity of integrating internal and e,aernal information (Swanson 1978), and the importance of
the product management task to the organization.

One issue in the study of organizations as I/P systems is
the consideration of the cost of information acquisition,
distribution, and use. That issue, however, is beyond the
scope of this research, which focuses on the relationship

Equivocality can be reduced when managers use computer-based systems in combination with face-to-face communications (McKenney 1986).

between information supply, use, and knowledge.
2.

Tichy (1980) suggests two social factors within organizations which could influence I/P capabilities: culture and
power. Organizational culture affects the supply and use
of information resources by influencing the values and

RESEARCH MODEL

The OIP framework proposes that organizations face information requirements generated by their environment,
organization structure, and tasks (Tushman and Nadler

attitudes toward information, analysis, (Feldman and
March 1981; Schein 1985), amount and intrusiveness of
environmental scanning (Daft and Lengel 1986), and attitude toward risk (Schein 1985). Those in power deter-

1978). These requirements can be characterized by their
level of complexity and load (Driver and Streufert 1969),

mine the goals and decision making issues, define which
functions are critical to the organization, control information resources, distribute rewards and incentives, and interpret or impose meaning on ambiguous goals or events
(Salancik and Pfeffer 1977)· Thus power influences infor-

uncertainty (Daft and Weick 1984; Galbraith 1973), and
equivocality or ambiguity (Weick 1979). High levels of
information complexity can be caused by several factors,
including having diverse and interrelated product lines
and having many competitors. High complexity is managed by differentiation or specialization (Driver and
Streufert 1969), for example, segmenting a market and

mation supply. A group's power, influence, and behavior
also may relate to who controls the larger organizational
unit in which it resides (Aldefer 1987). For example,

assigning a product management specialist to each segment. Load is the amount of information processed per
time period. Overload occurs when load exceeds pro-

PMs may have more power and access to information in
a company run by marketers than by engineers.

cessing capacity (Driver and Streufert 1969), and is managed either by reducing input, for example by aggregating

data, or by increasing capacity with more efficient infor-

,

mation exchange (Miller 1977), for example by quantita-

AND DISTRIBUTION

tainty is defined as lack of information (Galbraith 1973),

- 1

the inability to predict something (Kahnemann and Tversky 1982), or volatility (Duncan 1972).

INFORMATION
REQUIREMENTS

INFORMATION SUPPLY

tive rather than verbal reports, where applicable. Uncer-

--

INFORMATION USE

High levels of

-

uncertainty require the capability to gather relevant information in a flexible and timely manner (Poole 1978), inferring facts from incomplete information (Isenberg
1986), creating contingent procedures and plans (Gal-

-

KNOWLEDGE

ACQUISITION

braith 1973; March and Simon 1958) or creating information buffers (Kmetz 1984). Equivocality occurs when

Figure 1. Information Supply Model

there are multiple and conflicting interpretations of infor-
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SOCIAL

FACTORS
--

,

KNOWLEDGE

BASE

We propose an information supply model (Figure 1), derived from the OIP framework, focusing on the organization's availability of information, its use of information,
and its acquisition of knowledge. Organizations enact

values or intensity in natural settings (Benbasat, Goldstein, and Mead 1987; Yin 1984).

cycles of information gathering, interpretation, and
learning or knowledge development (Daft and Weick

(George and McKeown 1985). Focus was provided by
selecting cases which differ on a limited number of
dimensions of interest. The similarities between case
sites is discussed in the following section. The primary
differences were in the information technology provided

We employed the structured focused comparison method

1984). Knowledge plays a critical role in this process.
The information available to the organization is both interpreted within the context of an existing knowledge
base, and is added to that base. Knowledge can be factual, procedural, or causal (Machlup 1980). Interpretation and analysis combine information representing the
state of the world with existing knowledge to increase

to integrate, access, distribute, and analyze data; the fin-

ancial and human resources allocated to information
analysis; the social influences on I/P within the organization; and the level of knowledge about markets and pro-

understanding. Information use depends on information

ducts.

supply and distribution and its fit to information requirements. Culture, power, and the organization's existing

To provide structure, the participants in this study were
each interviewed for approximately one hour, guided by a
scmistructured interview protocol to provide consistency,
yet allow for free response. Eight members of the product management organization at the first company and
six at the second company were interviewed. Their titles
ranged from assistant product manager to vice president
of marketing. The interview guide is included in Exhibit
1. Participants were questioned about their background,
their work, the characteristics of the product/market environment in which they operated, and their use of information. In addition, interviews were conducted with ten
information providers at the first company and nine at
the second. The information providers all supplied information or technical support for PMs. They included
members of the MIS, market research, and trade promo-

knowledge base influence information supply, distribution,
and use, and knowledge acquisition.
Our objectives were to better understand the role of information supply, distribution, and use, social influences,
and knowledge within the OIP framework. In the cases
presented here, the focus is on information about the environment (e.g., market share, price/volume relationships,
competitor activities, etc.). The information supply model
provides some guidelines for interpreting the differences
between companies related to different levels of information supply. Specifically, we propose:
Proposition 1: Given a requirement for more infor-

mation and an organization's capacity to process it,

an increase in the supply and distribution or infor-

tion groups at each company. They were asked about the
type of information support they provided and about how
the PMs used information and analytic tools. Additional

mation appropriate to a manager's task will lead to
greater information use.

structure and focus was provided by formulating research

Proposition 2: More information use will lead to

propositions to guide the data analysis (George and Mc-

greater knowledge acquisition and a larger knowledge base.

Keown 1985). Participant response data was analyzed
using constructs identified in Figure 1. Numbers are used
to identify each participant's quotes, when they are in-

Proposition 3: Information supply, distribution, and
use and knowledge acquisition will be influenced by

cluded in the following sections.

the organization's level of existing knowledge.
4.

RESEARCH SITES

Proposition 4: Supply, distribution, and use of in-

formation, and knowledge acquisition will be in-

Both organizations studied were autonomous divisions of

fluenced by the organization's culture and its distri-

different multi-billion dollar packaged consumer goods

bution of power.

3.

companies specializing in food products. Each used a
traditional product (or brand) management structure,
with PMs responsible for managing the "health" and per-

RESEARCH METHOD AND DESIGN

formance of a specific product and for integrating various
functional areas in support of that product (Quelch,
Farris, and Olver 1987). Supermarkets (also referred to

Because relatively little empirical research exists on organizational information processing, we chose to conduct

as the trade or the customer) were the primary wholesale

exploratory qualitative field research. The strength of this

customer and retail outlet for both companies.

method lies in its ability to consider complex phenomena
in relevant, real-world settings, to uncover the "hows" and
"whys" of complex processes, to provide a "reality check'

At both companies, product management, market research, sales and trade promotion analysis were function-

ally separate units. Market research monitored and anal-

for theories we do not yet understand well, and to observe the importance of constructs and the range of

yzed trends, designed research and interpreted results,
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and monitored consumer attitudes and usage patterns by
product. The sales force was a primary source of information about supermarket pricing and promotion, both
for proprietary and competitor products. Sales promotion

aggressive, fast moving, risk taking, and responsive to the
market. Analysis was seen as getting in the way of action.

Two interviewees commented:
We want to move fast and not wait for information.
(6)

(i. e., coupons, give-aways, etc.) was managed regionally by

the sales force. They were supported by a trade promotion analysis group, which served as a conduct of information from the sales force to the rest of the company.

Reliance on information systems can slow a company
down and make it inflexible. If you required that

Internal operations data (orders, sales, production, inven-

nothing goes out without research or analysis to back

tory, shipments, product costs, and profitability) were
kept in a mainframe database managed by the MIS de-

it up, you lose a heck of a lot of time and flexibility.
(13)

partment. External marketing data purchased from third

party vendors was stored in a database on a division-controlled minicomputer. It could be reviewed using preformatted reports or selectively displayed using a marketing decision support system (MDSS) which also provided simple file listings and limited computation. (Both
companies used the same MDSS.) Exhibit 2 briefly ex-

In the past, the product management concept had not

been considered very successful at Alpha. Many partici-

pants expressed ambiguity over the role of marketing in
the company:

Top management hasn't figured out what we Iproduct

plains the sources of external data available for purchase.

management] should be doing. (7)

Both companies had a liaison group linking product management and MIS, which helped product managers to
retrieve and manipulate information from both minicomputer and mainframe databases.

If I were a product manager now, I would be concerned. (15)
Information Supply and Distribution. The company was
experiencing both mainframe hardware capacity and MIS
staffing constraints. End user computing was discouraged
and formal support for the mainframe fourth generation
language had been discontinued. The company owned
thirty personal computers, some of which were available
for check-out by PMs. However, there was no PC
training or support, and no PMs had PCS on their desks.
Although data could be down-loaded to a PC, no PMs
knew how to do this. The mainframe systems provided
several pre-formatted sales and inventory reports by product and customer. Additional reports could be requested, but lead time could range from two months to to

Product managers in both companies used similar types

of information for similar analyses: data about share of
market, gross sales, price, and promotion activity was
used for planning and controlling shard, volume and promotion costs, monitoring product performance and competitor actions, monitoring inventory levels, and performing special projects and ad hoc analysis to "explain"
the data.

Both companies were moving from a national to a regional and local marketing focus and had transferred
some responsibility for promotion and data analysis to the

over one year.
group:

sales force supported by a trade promotions group.
Changes in consumer food consumption patterns had affects both companies. Each had developed new products
in response to these changes.

One interviewee described the MIS

Like many companies, we have a production-oriented
MIS shop. Just understanding the concept of ad hoc
data retrieval is a quantum leap for them. (8)

4.1 Company Alpha

Company Alpha had sales of $300 million. Its oldest produet line, which represented 35 percent of sales, was declining in volume and had little competition. Its other
products were facing more competition and were growing

SAMI data could be retrieved from the divisional minicomputer using the marketing decision support system
(MDSS). Use of the MDSS twice per week was consi-

in volume. The company was generally a leader in its
markets, however, one important new product was number two and was facing stiff competition in an attempt to
gain market share. Consumer purchasing patterns were
regional for some products but not for others. Alpha had
historically operated in niche markets, creating products
for those niches and avoiding head-on competition from
larger companies.

Most ad hoc analyses were prepared manually. SAMI
did not provide data on competitors' goods that were delivered directly to stores. Because many of Alpha's competing products were directly delivered, it was difficult to
calculate accurate market share figures for Alpha or for
its competitors. Product managers obtained information
for these competitors by in-store observation of shelf

Social factors.

MAJERS data was not purchased because it was considered too expensive. Product managers, however, ex-

dered heavy; many product managers did not use it at all.

space and product movement throughout the country.

Participants from Company Alpha de-

scribed it as entrepreneurial, innovative, action-oriented,
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pressed a need for it. Sales force information on compe-

The data doesn't give any information about promo-

tion effectiveness at the store level. Did the outlets
reduce the price like they were supposed to? Did the
promotion spur buying? (5)

titive activity was circulated via newsletter, not codified or

stored in an information system.

Historical information on redemption rates for past promotions had limited use. The data was available on a
national basis, while the promotions were implemented
regionally. Promotional spending data included only expenses of the sales force and did not include rebates

Information Use. The PMs used the available information to carry out performance, promotion, and competitor
analyses. They limited their use of quantitative data to

issued directly from corporate to the trade.
commented:

looking primarily at national trends.

One PM

SAMI data and

shipment reports were the primary information sources
for tracking performance. Custom reports were used to
examine key markets (e.g., a market in which Alpha was

Everyone wants to be more market oriented, but no
one has the tools (data) to do it. So you've got to to
a promotional program to see how well it works. (9)

introducing a new product). A member of the liaison
group would extract SAMI data for those markets using

The sales force was considered a very important source of

the MDSS. If more information was needed, PMs would
usually contact the trade promotion group or sales force

information. A PM noted:

for their interpretation of the quantitative data. Since
promotion cost and redemption reports were not accurate
or timely, PMs relied on the trade promotion group and
sales force for promotion evaluation. Many decisions,
such as changes in product formulation or packaging
were subjective and made without analysis of quantitative
data.

The sales force is our eyes and ears. We have less

factual information about the market compared to
my previous employer. Here, I visit the market more
and talk to my sales force more. (1)

The data used by PMs at Alpha were not integrated.

Product managers commented on their analysis of quantitative data:

Product managers felt that access to data was often complex and time-consuming. In general, they did not have
access to all of the information they needed:

There is not enough time to do analysis. We're a
lean organization and we're ci,nstrained by time. We

There is a lot of information around that I can't get
to. The MIS group might have some, but it's not
being given to the end user. We could use one per-

only do [analyze] the big stuff. (6)

son who knows what is available on the big computer
and makes it available to us. (9)

consuming and difficult to use. (10)

I'm not comfortable with the computer.

It's time

There is not a lot of analysis being done right now.
We are close to operating totally in the dark. This is
due in part to limited people resources. It's still better than in the 1960s when just gathering data took
all the time. Now it takes one day instead of two
weeks, but that's still not good enough. (11)

I've never felt that there's a lot of information around

here. If it's available, it's not convenient to get.
What you have to go through to get it is not worth
the effort. I have to spend a lot more time gathering
and analyzing information than using it. (10)

Many times we don't know what information we need
until we get into the analysis. To figure out what the
competition is doing and beat them, the more information the better. (6)

Knowledge. Most participants indicated that their lack of
data and analytic tools limited the amount of knowledge
they had or could develop about their products, markets,
competitors, and promotions. Some commented:

Product managers also faulted the currency and level of

With more information I'd have a better understanding of may brand. (10)

detail of the available data:

Having more information would raise my comfort

It takes two months to learn of competitor actions
using SAMI data, another month to confirm a trend,
and two months to analyze the data and implement

level. Now we operate more based on experience
and feel. (6)

action. After five months, the competitor is gone and

it's too late! (5)

Here the approach is "if the information is not

The information doesn't give me a good enough
sense of regional differences in sales. (5)

actionable, why spend money acquiring it?" We
therefore acquire less information. Much of the information acquired by my previous employer was
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actionable at some future point or was great background, but was not actionable immediately. (9)

I have more exposure [than at my previous employer]

to top management and sales, to get their thinking
and viewpoints. I don't have the amount of information that I had before, but I don't know whether information would provide the key points to determine
where to go with the brand. (6)

We don't have a general and relatively current understanding of purchasing dynamics. We don't know
how much cross purchasing there is or the proportion
of people who are deal-responsive or brand loyal.
We don't know the demographics of our purchasers
and how they might be changing. (13)

4.2 Company Beta

Company Beta had sales of over $1 billion. The market
for its oldest product was stable after several years of decline. The product was extremely price competitive. Its

The lack of historical information and the inability to reIate outcomes with actions limited the amount of knowledge in some specific areas, such as designing promotions and analyzing competitor behavior. Some PMs
commented:

other products were growing and faced less competition.
The company was the market leader in all of its product
categories. It had two national and several regional com-

petitors. Consumer purchasing and consumption patterns
differed significantly by region for most of Beta's products. The cost of raw ingredients was a significant factor
and strongly influenced product profitability and mar-

We're finding it difficult to plan any promotions in
many areas of the country. I need to know what the
hot buttons are to get people to eat the product. I
need to know what works well, where. There is little

information to help me figure this out.
missing the causal dimension.

keting spending. A recent supply shortage caused the
price of Beta's primary ingredient, and thus competition
on price, to become quite volatile.

We're

We've been in the

business for a year and the promotions have not been

effective. (9)

Social factors. Beta considered itself to be an informa-

tion-driven organization.

It embraced the notion of

creating competitive advantage from information re-

In developing new promotions, ideally we would look

at previous ones. We don't do enough of it. We

sources. It had made several changes to its organization

should go back to SAMI and examine the promotion,
looking at the numbers before, during and after the
promotion to evaluate its effectiveness. (6)

within the last few years "to commit to the long term
growth of the information infrastructure," according to a
senior executive. The marketing and information systems
divisions were combined to "integrate the experts on external information (market research) with the experts on
internal information (MIS): The company had worked
with third party data vendors to learn how to use the data
they provided.

I'd like to know how effective promotions are by
chain, so I can change them next time around, and so

I can ask the sales force why it didn't work. (9)
I'd like to know what works for trade and consumer
promotions, advertising, packaging changes, and
shelving changes. (5)

Product managers considered the division to be analytically oriented. They "earned their stripes" by learning to
perform tasks requiring quantitative analysis. Some commented:

We are especially lax in knowing the strengths and

weaknesses of competitors' new products and how
they fit into the who buying scenario. How will it

We're very fact-oriented and we're very analytical.
We make our decisions based on facts, combined
with history and experience. We depend on data.

affect us? How should we respond? None of that
analysis tends to be done here. (13)

That's the way we manage our business. (8)

We do not look at the impact of competitors' actions
on our volume and spending. There is no place to
store it on the system and no analytical tools. This is
very important for forecasting. It will become more
important as we enter competitive businesses. We
have been isolated from the competition. (15)

There is more confidence in the results if they come
from a computer. (3)

Product managers at Beta were considered "the focal
point of the brand." They had responsibility for setting
volume and share targets and for making marketing deci-

I have a feeling for trade deals but I don't have the
facts. (5)

sions for their products. However, the sales force was
gaining power and was increasingly being relied on to
analyze marketing information.

One PM commented that the kind of information he had
was different than the type he had in his previous job:

Information Supply and Distribution. Individual training
about the available data and analytic tools was provided
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by the information systems support group. A minicomputer housed both SAMI and MAJERS data, as well as

We track competitor promotions all the time because

an integrated database which combined and standardized

motional spending data for us and the competitors is
available up to the hour. Things change rapidly. We
can evaluate the impact of competitors' actions on
our total spending in minutes and react immediately.
(2)

price is such an important part of our business. Pro-

SAMI and MAJERS data by geographic areas and time
periods. Data was kept by product for each of the 52
markets, 19 districts, and five regions into which Beta
divided the country. Shelf price and promotion data, reported by the sales force, was stored at the account and
market level. Since it was one to two months out-of-date
by the time it was put on the computer, PMs keyed the
data into their PCs directly from source documents.

Information use. The PMs used the available information to analyze performance, promotion, and competitor
activity. SAMI reports provided an overview of share and
volume. Most PMs performed additional analysis of the
data using their PCs. For example, every assistant PM
was responsible for creating and using a spreadsheet model to track customer inventory and actual versus planned
consumption. The model was used to forecast volume

Every PM was authorized to have a PC. They were used
constantly by assistants and associates (the "number
crunchers"), but infrequently by the senior PM staff. All
PMs were trained to use Lotus. Because of the computational limits of the MDSS, Lotus was heavily used. A
linear regression package was available, but was used by
only a few PMs. Most relied on market research for sta-

and share for the next period. Forecasts were supplied to

the production unit and were broken down into local
goals for the sales force.

tistical analysis.

Preformatted market share and volume reports were produced monthly from SAMI data. PMs used the MDSS

Most PMs used their PCs to track promotions, including
verifying that the trade offered the proper promotional
price, comparing their price to competitors' prices, and

primarily to extract data and to aggregate information by
ad hoc geographic areas and time periods. The systems
group provided assistance for extracting data and struc-

volume. In addition, many used their PCs to perform ad

tracking the impact of the promotion on share and

turing reports. Ad hoc extracts of data from the main-

hoc analyses and special projects.
These included
creating models of the effectiveness of features by market

frame could be done overnight on request. Data could

or customer, modeling customer inventory levels to insure

be downloaded directly from the minicomputer to the PC.
This was cumbersome and most PMs extracted and then
rekeyed the data.

and anticipate adequate supply of product during promotions, and analyzing relationships and trends using

One member of the information systems support group
commented on his role:

changes, such as new packaging or product reformulation,
on share and volume. One PM used scanner data to

graphics. PCs were used to track planned versus actual
media spending by market and to monitor the impact of

track market share for the previous week, avoiding the
two month SAMI time lag. Another used it to analyze
promotion results at a more detailed level than could be
done using SAMI.

If I notice that PMs seem to be doing a lot of typing
in of data or that they are using calculators, I'll question them and maybe I can help them do it on the
mini. I like to get as much support time in as I can
on a flexible basis. I try to make myself available
based on their time constraints. (10)

Some PMs commented on their use of information technology:

Some PMs actively sought additional data sources. Two
were using scanner data that were purchased for a few

Now we can do more detailed, accurate and effective
analysis, for example, by tracking average shelf price
for us and our competitors in 52 markets rather than
averaging at the level of 19 districts. (3)

markets and were being tested by the sales force. Others
were attempting to integrate mainframe and minicomputer data, with support from the systems group.

PMs worked closely with market research and considered

It's easier to aggregate data by specific [ad hoc] geographics. (8)

them a high quality source of both quantitative and qualitative information. The advertising group and the sales

In the past, gathering competitive information took so

force provided less information to the PMs. The trade
promotions group was an important source of quantitative
data about promotions and competitor activity. They
tracked planned and actual promotion results by brand,
package size, market, district, region, and event. In addition, they evaluated promotion effectiveness and maintained an historical database of previous promotions.

Iong that it wasn't worth the effort. Now I can sit
here and talk to you about any business problem with

all the facts. They come automatically to me at my
fingertips. I don't have to run around to get the data.
(8)

Even though my use [of information technology] is

One member of the group commented:

fairly limited, I can be more responsive to my
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management, I can pull up stuff and present it in a
usable way. (9)

Right now we're using a lot of judgement in making
trade-off decisions about whether to spend money in

We can do a lot of "what if' costing, forecasting and

one market or another. If we could do sensitivity
analyses on different strength franchises in all of our
markets in different parts of the country, we would
know how to spend our money more effectively.

budgeting scenarios. (4)

Use of information technology at senior PM levels was
limited. One senior manager who did use the technology

Now we do this only on an exception basis. (2)

saw benefits to its use but potential problems for

The PMs felt that the need for more information would

managers not familiar with the technology.

be answered by access to point-of-sale scanner data:

He com-

mented:

Traditionally we use SAMI data to reflect the shipments made from the customer's warehouse to the
store. To the extent that SAMI correlates with consumer purchases it gives us an idea of how much pro-

Because I'm a responsible for an entire product
group, PIn the only one who thinks about it (as an
integrated group). So there are a number of projects
that you really can't give to an assistant.

duct is being consumed. Scanner data represents the

relatively new dimension of what is actually leaving
the supermarket. The scanner data will tell us on a
weekly basis how much we're moving through the
cash register. This is the closest we can get to the
consumer without going into their house. The closer
we are to the consumer, the easier it is to correlate
product movement with consumption. Currently
there is a lot of judgment (rather than analysis) behind spending decisions. We really need that infor-

It's now to the point where this stuff (technology) is
very dangerous because all these PMs who don't
know how to use it don't have access to the basic
data. They just cannot get output. At six o'clock in
the morning or at night, they may be the only person
around. (9)

Knowledge. Company Beta had been actively attempting
to increase the information, knowledge, and skills of its
PMs. For example, it had worked directly with outside
data vendors to better learn how to use the data they
provided. Several PMs compared the current information
environment to the one that existed a few years earlier:

mation. (2)

Others had mixed feelings about the data and skills
required to effectively use scanner data:

It could be terrific and it could be a disaster. It
could be a disaster if we treat it the same way as we

Before, we could not easily access historical data. It

have treated our data up to now. That would probably reduce effectiveness because we would be so

was easier to use current information, rather than
using someone else's experience to make a better
decision. Now, I can do it easily. For example, say
we wanted to lower the price of product X by $1.00
in a market. If someone told me that we did that

inundated that we would truly lose sight of the forest
for the trees. If we can be selective, this can help us

really understand what makes a ... [unit of product]
move off a shelf, which is what it's all about. It's a
whole new level of understanding. But what you have
to do is to look at that in one place or maybe two
places for general conclusions. You must learn your

two years ago and it was the best thing we ever did, I
can quickly look back at the price and share data for

that time period to confirm the results. Now I can
go into a meeting with some perspective. (8)

business from those individual movements and not try
to analyze 50,000 individual movements. We need to

You can correlate more things with the PC. You can
use more information and put it together more effectively. (3)

learn how the thing works and once we understand
that I think it has potential. (9)

A senior marketing manager had concerns about missing
opportunities:

We certainly have a much better managed database
now than we did five years ago, in terms of knowing
things. (9)

Product managers are more effective because of
information technology, but the use of those data

is still the same as it was five years ago. They
don't do anything different on the computer than

One PM, however, felt a need for analyzing more information in greater detail:

I did with my old calculator, they just do it faster.

We have a lot of data on promotion spending level
venus volume impact, but what we haven't included

There has not been that "great leap forward"

is the customer level results. We need to link custo-

proving decision making. We will probably need

from speeding up clerical tasks to really im-

mer results to share of market and promotion

some other impetus, some creative light to think

spending level. (2)

about how we make that leap because it's not
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going to come by itself. It's not going to happen
just because they have these PCs sitting in their

the managers in both companies performed the same
basic functions using the same types of information. We,
therefore, can test the propositions by comparing the impact of level of information supply and distribution at the
two companies, which have similar information requirements. Specifically, we would expect that information use
and knowledge acquisition would be greater at the com-

offices.
We still do very basic things very poorly. We do
very poor trend analysis, very little regression
analysis, very little causal analysis or even noncausal black box trend analysis. We plot the
trends on the graph, and that's about it. A way
in which it could probably become truly more
effective is if we could make good projections of

pany with a higher level of information supply and distribution.

what is about to happen rather than looking back
at what has already happened, somehow use this

support the research propositions.

data to make a base projection and to build in

to them than PMs at Company Alpha. They used more
information and acquired more knowledge. In addition,
there is evidence that both cultural differences and differences in level of knowledge between the companies
affected information supply, information use, and knowledge acquisition.

A comparison of the two companies provides evidence to

additional assumptions to make them better. (9)

The PM also saw benefits to networking the various
levels of the hierarchy to more effectively combine his
knowledge and experience with their analysis:

I'd like to do more forward planning, and if I had

Information supply and distribution was greater at Beta

electronic access to my assistants' files it would be a
lot of help. Now it is a pain in the neck to get data,
massage them, and build trends into them to project
something. The assistants rewrite the databases for
their own purposes, and they would be much more
usable for me than the mini databases. There are
some things I want to be able to look at. They do

than Alpha. Beta had a greater supply of both internal
and external data. It received data on retail prices for its
and competitors' products from the sales force; Alpha did

not. Only Beta purchased features and scanner data. In
addition, Beta integrated its external information sources,
facilitating more sophisticated and extensive analysis.
Alpha, in contrast, had developed and used qualitative
sources of information more than Beta, relying primarily
on the sales force and trade promotion group, and per-

analysis, but after so many years, I could look at
something and probably pick out that there is something funny here, something really strange. (9)

sonal visits to the field.

Some PMs felt that there was a trade-off to focusing on

With respect to information distribution, data were more
accessible at Beta and more analytic tools were available.
Alpha discouraged ad hoc access to internal information.
Report modifications and requests took months to receive. Hardware constraints limited direct access to internal data. PMs at Alpha felt that information was in-

quantitative analysis:

Access to more data allows us to get closer to the

facts and act faster, but too much detail also encourages short term tactical analysis rather than strategic analysis. People can get caught up in the numbers and not look at the strategic issues. (8)

5.

In general, PMs at

Company Beta had more data and analytic tools available

convenient to access or retrieve.

PCs were not readily

accessible at Alpha, nor was training provided in their
use. Beta made a PC available to any PM wanting one.

All junior PMs received individual PC training and

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

created the standard "state-of-the-brand" spreadsheet as
part of their training.

Although the small sample size (N=2) does not allow us
to statistically analyze the propositions, the richness of
the case data and the detailed description of the process
by which each company uses information and analytic
tools and produces knowledge provides a basis for testing
the propositions. Yin (1984) suggests that each case site

Information use was greater at Beta than Alpha, pro-

viding evidence to support proposition 1. PMs at Beta

used spreadsheet software for several tasks including
tracking customer inventory and media spending, budgeting, and forecasting volume and share. They analyzed
the impact of their and competitors' promotions, of new
packaging, and of product reformulations. In addition,
they developed models of the impact of features. They
tracked price and analyzed promotion data at a market

should be viewed as an experiment and not as a data
point. Just as when conducting two experiments, the
findings from the two sites provide insights which can be
examined to see how well they generalize.

level.
Both companies had similar market environments and
organizational contexts. Beta had experienced somewhat

PMs in Alpha used quantitative data only for an overview
of market activity and did little or no additional processing if nothing unusual occurred. They followed up

more price competition in one part of its product line,
driving the need for promotion information. However,
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with qualitative information from the field if more de-

had the skills to analyze the environment.

tailed explanation or understanding was required. PMs at

greater progress in tying outcomes to actions, thus providing analytical feedback for knowledge advancement.

Beta also used their information to gain an overview.
However, all assistant and associate PMs did more detailed, routine quantitative analysis and many did addi-

It made

Beta was able to leverage its experiences by codifying and

storing action results and providing access to that mformation. Alpha was less able to provide this support for
learning and knowledge.

tional ad hoc analysis.

The differences between the two companies can be
viewed in the context of information requirements. Beta

Perhaps the most important outcome was Beta's develop-

better addressed the complexity of the environment than

ment of information and skills for analyzing competition.

Alpha.

It supplied information that PMs could more

Since Alpha was just beginning to face increasing compe-

easily structure to match the structure of their markets,
products, and competition. The greater amount and
timeliness of information provided a better response to
environmental uncertainty at Beta. Alpha, in contrast,
was "close to operating totally in the dark" and had a
lower "comfort level". Information overload was not a

tition in its markets, it historically had not required this
knowledge. Many participants considered this lack of
knowledge to be Alpha's greatest weakness; information
technology support could have its greatest benefit for
Alpha by providing the means to develop this knowledge.
The implications for management are that learning and

problem for either company. Scanner data could, however, pose problems
for Beta.

information technology go hand-in-hand. Information
systems not only supply facts, but allow the company to
build a knowledge base, develop analytical skills, and provide analytical feedback to evaluate actions and increase
knowledge.

Alpha was oriented more toward qualitative information
exchange. Beta's infrastructure was geared primarily toward quantitative information processing and exchange.
Alpha was operating with somewhat inefficient channels
by using qualitative information where quantitative would
have been more appropriate. However, rich channels
might have better supported implementation, thus facilitating action. Beta was operating efficiently with quantitative information, having defined the world unequivocally in terms of price, volume, promotion spending, and
market share. However, PMs might have had a less developed capability to reduce equivocality, if needed.

Information technology was most useful in developing
tactical, not strategic, knowledge. Tactical knowledge is
rooted in unequivocal, quantitative analysis of analyzable
information.
Strategy is qualitative and equivocal.
Alpha's PMs may have had a better strategic feel for
their products and markets, while Beta's may have been
better tacticians. Management must recognize the difference, understand when to promote one versus the
other, and provide the information technology infrastructure which balances the two.

Product managers at Alpha knew less than their counter-

The level of knowledge at each company influenced its

parts at Beta, providing evidence to support proposition

approach to information supply, information use, and

knowledge acquisition, providing evidence to support
proposition 3. At Alpha, PMs knew less about the factors that affected the marketing of their products. Their
supply, use, and knowledge acquisition focused on

2. PMs at Alpha did not know the impact of previous
promotions and found it difficult to plan promotions in
many regions. PMs at Beta, in contrast, examined the
impact of previous promotions and used this knowledge
to plan new ones. PMs at Alpha were lacking causal data
and hence did not know to what degree various factors

gathering basic causal information at a national level and
only focusing on regions on an exception basis. PMs at

influenced sales (e.g., features, coupons, or in-store dis-

Beta knew more about the impact of specific marketing

programs at a detailed geographic level. Their informa-

plays). They also knew less about the actions of competitors and their impact.

tion use focused on building sophisticated models to gain

incremental benefits in profits.
Based on our analysis of the two companies, we propose
that given some degree of fit between information supply
and distribution, and demand, the greater the amount of
technology and resources allocated to information supply,
distribution, and use, the greater the knowledge about the

information environment.

There is evidence that a relationship exists between culture and the approach company's take to supply information, use information, and acquire knowledge, pro-

viding evidence to support proposition 4. One of the
most striking differences between the companies was

By greater knowledge, we

mean more facts and a better understanding of the relationships among variables Uaikumar and Bohn 1986).
We do not mean to imply that greater knowledge is always desirable. It must be evaluated within some context.

their respective cultures. Each company's culture fit their
approach to marketing: Alpha responsively creating and

quickly implementing niche products, Beta competing
head-on with other major producers frequently on price.
At Alpha, the culture was described as action-oriented
and entrepreneurial and less energy was expended on
gathering and analyzing information and less emphasis

In this case, having greater knowledge would probably
increase Alpha's return on marketing investment. Beta
had much greater knowledge about its environment and it
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was placed on acquiring knowledge. PMs at Beta considered the company information-driven. Management

information to create "causal" marketing models. The
technology at Beta was supporting learning. It was sustaining the PM's demand for information at a higher level
of knowledge.

valued data analysis and knowledge acquisition.

It is difficult, however, to conclude that either the culture
or the level of knowledge was the primary influence on

6.

the approach to I/P. Similarly, it is not clear whether
greater supply and use of quantitative information in Beta
resulted from or was one cause of the cultural difference.
We tentatively conclude that culture, level of knowledge,

SUMMARY

Our use of field-based case research has allowed us to
meaningfully explore a topic about which little is unequivocally known. The strength of the method lies in its ability to help us understand a complex process which takes

and information supply and use represent a selfreinforcing web of causal links (Weick 1979).

place in a real-world setting. Our results provide the
basis for future research in three areas. First, we are
performing additional case research in several sites to

Moving a company to different levels of analytical/factual
knowledge poses a challenge for management to break

the loop. One potential approach is by managing or
changing the culture (Schein 1985), another by investing

learn more about how managers use information. Second, we are performing longitudinal case research in

in new (to the organization) information technologies and
letting the organization experiment and learn (McFarlan
and McKenney 1983). Ultimately, management must

some of these sites to determine the impact of increasing
the amount of data and analytic tools on knowledge and

other outcome variables. Third, we are developing a survey, in which some of the concepts presented here will be
quantified and the propositions will be empirically
tested. The case study has been especially valuable in
identifying areas in which to focus the quantitative data
collection.

make the strategic decision of whether to manage the
company as an information interpreter (Daft and Weick

1984) or an action generator (Brunsson 1985), and
manage the information infrastructure accordingly.

This research identifies a limitation in the OIP framework. According to the framework, fit of I/P requirements and capabilities is a stationary and attainable objective. Because the use/knowledge relationship may be

We proposed a model whereby information use was influenced by characteristics of the information supply and
distribution, and whereby knowledge increased with in-

reciprocal, rather than causal, fit may become a moving

creasing information use. We further proposed that these
relationships would be subject to the social forces and the
level of knowledge within the organization. Our observations supported our model. Meeting an organization's

target. Use of information is affected by (as well as affecting) level of knowledge, and supply and demand are
not static. On one hand, what we know limits how we

interpret and analyze information, reinforcing existing
knowledge (Anderson 1985). The supply of information

information needs requires supplying and distributing information appropriate to the problem and understanding
and managing the culture in which the information technology will reside and the level of knowledge within the
organization. Our results further suggest that unequivo-

and the technology to analyze it, if limited to equivocal
sources, further reinforces the current level of knowledge
(Feldman 1986). On the other hand, knowledge drives
demand. The more we know, the more we want to know.
Information technology which supplies unequivocal feedback and the tools to analyze it can break the reinforcing

loop and increase knowledge.

cal information, analytical use, and analyzable knowledge

increase tactical but not strategic decision making capabilities. Finally, our results suggested that the notion of

Greater knowledge al-

attainable fit may be a myth, and that once closed

towed Beta to be more directed in defining and meeting

learning cycles (Hedberg 1981) are implemented, man-

its information needs. As knowledge increases, more
variables and relationships are identified and made ex-

agers must be prepared to manage continual and
changing demand for more refined information support.

plicit, and more facts are demanded. As more facts arc
gathered and analyzed, knowledge increases and the

7.
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Decision

EXHIBIT 1

GUIDELINES FOR PRODUCT MANAGER INTERVIEWS
I.

Introduce self and project stressing confidentiality of the study

II.

What are the most important tasks that you perform?
A. For each task:

1.

Describe it.

2.

What information do you use in carrying out the task?

3.

Where does the information come from? Probe to find out what information is coming from people
and what is coming from systems.

4.

What analytic tools do you use (if any) in performing the task? What tools are used by others to
provide you with the information that you use?

5.

What is the impact of having this information on the performance of the task? How would you do the

task differently with less or more information?
III.
IV.

V.

Are there other ways that you use information or analytic tools in your work? Gather information on the use
of personal computers, PC software, mainframe computers and software, electronic mail, etc.
Is there other information that you receive from others that you use in your work?

What factors influence your use of IT?
A. What aspects of the company influence your use of IT? What aspects of your division (or business unit)?

What aspects of your product? What aspects of yourself?
VI.

VII.

What, if any, changes have occurred in your work due to the increased availability of data and analytic tools?
What, if any, changes do you expect to occur in the next few years?

EXHIBIT 2
PRIMARY THIRD PARTY VENDOR DATA SOURCES USED BY RESEARCH SITES
SAMI:

Supermarket warehouse withdrawals (dollars and units) and computed share-of-market by product,
geographic area, and time period. SAMI was bought for a category of products and contained
information for all competitors' products in that category. It was used as a proxy for retail sales.
It includes only warehoused items and, therefore, does not include all goods sold in supermarkets
(e.g., meat sold in the delicatessen section is not in SAMI). Reported monthly approximately four
weeks after the end of the month. Purchased by both companies.

MAJERS:

Supermarket promotions (e.g., coupons, give-aways), featured items (c.g., end-of-aisle display), and
advertising type (e.g., newspaper ad size, in-store circular, etc.) by product, account, and time
period. Reported monthly (although company Beta negotiated weekly reports). Purchased only by
Beta.

SCANNER DATA:

Actual point-of-sale purchase volume by product, account (customer), and week. Reported weekly
about two weeks after the fact. Limited purchasing by Beta only, for experimentation and one

special project.

78

